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Abstract Decision situations are typically characterized by
uncertainty: Individuals do not know the values of different
options on a criterion dimension. For example, consumers do
not know which is the healthiest of several products. To make
a decision, individuals can use information about cues that are
probabilistically related to the criterion dimension, such as
sugar content or the concentration of natural vitamins. In
two experiments, we investigated how the accessibility of
cue information in memory affects which decision strategy
individuals rely on. The accessibility of cue information was
manipulated by means of a newly developed paradigm, the
spatial-memory-cueing paradigm , which is based on a
combination of the looking-at-nothing phenomenon and the
spatial-cueing paradigm. The results indicated that people use
different decision strategies, depending on the validity of
easily accessible information. If the easily accessible
information is valid, people stop information search and
decide according to a simple take-the-best heuristic. If,
however, information that comes to mind easily has a low
predictive validity, people are more likely to integrate all
available cue information in a compensatory manner.
Keywords Decisionmaking .Memory . Spatial attention .
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Imagine that you are shopping for breakfast cereal. As you
reach the supermarket shelf, you are stunned by the multitude
of different products, ranging from healthy-looking granola to
fancy peanut butter oatmeal. You hesitate for a moment, and
then grab a package of oat cereals. Back home you wonder
why you have chosen this product and not one of the
presumably tasty cornflakes.
Sometimes we deliberately control which stimuli in our
environment we pay attention to. This kind of attentional
control is assumed to be goal-driven and based on top-down
processing (Egeth & Yantis, 1997; James, 1890). Sometimes,
however, our attention is captured by a stimulus in a bottom-
up fashion, irrespective of the current goals (Itti & Koch,
2000, 2001; Parkhurst, Law, & Niebur, 2002; Parkhurst &
Niebur, 2004). For example, studies addressing the “pop-up
effect” have shown that salient stimuli can capture attention
involuntarily (Pashler, 1988; Theeuwes, 1991, 1992).
Marketing takes advantage of these effects. For instance,
companies use unusual packages that “stick out” to increase
the recognition value of their brand (Kardes, 1999). Chandon
and Wansink (2002) manipulated the visual salience of
different convenience goods by varying the product placement
(top shelf vs. lower shelf) or the color contrast of the label
(high vs. low contrast). As expected, salient products were
more likely to be consumed than less salient products.
Accordingly, you might have chosen oat cereals because of
their eye-catching package.
Another line of research expanded this approach from an
object level (decision objects vary with regard to their
salience) to a feature level (certain pieces of information about
decision objects are more salient than other information). In a
preference task by Mandel and Johnson (2002), participants
had to choose between different products, such as cars. Their
results indicated that participants who were primed with a
certain feature (e.g., safety vs. price) preferred those products
that excelled on the respective feature. These results were
replicated in judgment tasks in which participants had to
estimate, for example, the price of different products (Shah
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& Oppenheimer, 2007). Perceptually fluent information was
shown to affect judgments more strongly than disfluent
information. These studies provide another explanation for
your decision to purchase oat cereals: You might have chosen
them because a certain feature on the package (e.g., a sign
saying “low sugar content”), but not the product as such,
attracted your attention.
In these studies—as well as in most studies within the field
of judgment and decision making—relevant information is
provided at the time the judgment or the decision has to be
made. This is surprising, given that many everyday decisions
are based on information that has to be retrieved from long-term
memory (e.g., whether we enjoyed particular cereals in the
past). The present study is concerned with memory-based
decisions and investigates how the accessibility of information
inmemory affects decision behavior. The previouslymentioned
studies suggested a main effect of visual salience on decision
behavior: Salient products were preferred over less salient
products (Chandon & Wansink, 2002), and salient features
determined which product was chosen (Shah & Oppenheimer,
2007). Recent findings, however, have challenged this
assumption. In a multi-cue inference task, Platzer and Bröder
(2012) showed that decision behavior was determined by the
interaction of visual salience and the predictive quality of
features. More precisely, individuals used different decision
strategies, depending on whether salient information allowed
for making good decisions. This finding, which is also referred
to as the salience effect , suggests that your choice in the
introductory example might have been influenced by
information that came tomind easily (e.g., whether you enjoyed
the product in the past). However, the way that this information
is integrated into a judgment (i.e., the decision strategy that is
used) depends on its predictive quality. The aim of the
following experiments was to show that the salience effect is
just a special case of a broader phenomenon. Perceptual
salience is only one determinant of accessibility, but
other means of reducing retrieval costs have not yet
been explored. We will provide evidence that different
manipulations of the accessibility of information affect
strategy selection in the same way.
Decision strategies in multi-cue inferences from memory
Individuals can make decisions by using information
associated with the decision criterion. Going back to
our example, you might have been interested in
choosing the healthiest cereal that is available in the
supermarket (decision criterion ). Sugar content or
concentration of natural vitamins might serve as cues
to predict healthiness. The characteristic on a certain
cue (e.g., high or low sugar content) is called a cue
value . All cues are probabilistically related to the
decision criterion. They vary, however, in their
predictive validity.1 Whereas the sugar content of a food
item is highly correlated with healthiness, the predictive
power of protein content is probably lower. Since the
decision can be right or wrong (e.g., if you choose less
healthy cereals), it is also referred to as a multi-cue
inference decision .
In order to make a choice, decision makers have to integrate
the available cue information into a judgment and compare
different decision objects (e.g., different cereals) against each
other. Researchers have proposed a multitude of strategies for
doing so (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Payne, Bettman, &
Johnson, 1993). One crucial distinction is based on the
classification into noncompensatory and compensatory
strategies. Noncompensatory strategies, such as the take-the-
best heuristic (TTB; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) are considered
to be fast and frugal, since they incorporate just a subset of the
available information. TTB searches cues in the order of their
predictive validity starting with the most valid cue. If this cue
discriminates between objects (e.g., sugar content is high for
product A and low for product B), a decision is made (e.g.,
product B is chosen). If themost valid cue does not discriminate
between objects, the second most valid cue is considered, and
so on. Such simple heuristics have been shown to be as accurate
as more complex decision strategies in several environments
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Note that TTB’s search rule
assumes a deliberate retrieval of cues in the sequence of
decreasing cue validity. The stopping rule ends retrieval when
a discriminating cue is found, and the decision rule goes with
this discriminating cue. Only the compound of search rule,
stopping rule, and decision rule is referred to as TTB.
In contrast, compensatory strategies take all available cue
information into account. The “weighted additive rule” (WADD)
and the “equalweight rule” (EQW)make a choice by summing up
cue values and choosing the object with the largest sum. Whereas
WADDweights cue information differently (e.g., according to cue
validities), EQW uses uniform weights.
Following the idea that people possess a repertoire of
strategies to choose from, one crucial question arises: How do
individuals select from their repertoire of decision strategies?
Several approaches have been proposed to solve this strategy
selection problem . According to an effort–accuracy approach ,
individuals select the strategy from their repertoire that is easy
to apply and, at the same time, as accurate as possible (Beach &
Mitchell, 1978; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988, 1993).
Other approaches are based on reinforcement learning. For
example, strategy selection learning theory proposes that
1 We use the term cue validity in a broader sense here than, for example,
in the theory of probabilistic mental models (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, &
Kleinbölting, 1991), in which it is measured as the conditional probability
of a criterion value given a cue value. In the broader, Brunswikian sense,
the validity of a cue is its statistical relation to a judgment criterion that
can be measured by various contingency indices.
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people select the strategy that they expect to solve the decision
problem best. Expectancies, in turn, are assumed to bemodified
via reinforcement learning (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). A
promising complementary approach was recently proposed by
Marewski and Schooler (2011). The cognitive niches
framework states a two-stage process of strategy selection: (1)
in the first stage, the number of available strategies is restricted
by the cognitive system and the environment. Only a subset of
strategies can actually be applied in a certain situation (referred
to as a cognitive niche). (2) If different strategies are applicable,
strategy selection in the second stage depends on effort–
accuracy trade-offs, learning, or other selection mechanisms.
In sum, strategy selection has been shown to depend on
several factors, such as the environmental payoff structure
(Bröder, 2003; Bröder & Schiffer, 2006a; Payne et al., 1988;
Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999), time pressure (Payne et al.,
1988; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008), and cue costs (Bröder,
2000; Newell & Shanks, 2003; Newell, Weston, & Shanks,
2003). More importantly, however, strategy selection has been
shown to depend on whether decisions have to be made from
givens or frommemory (Hastie & Park, 1986).With decisions
from givens, cue information is directly available at the time
of decision making. You can, for instance, compare different
cereals by having a look at the nutrition facts reported on the
back of the packaging. Sometimes, however, cue information
has to be retrieved frommemory (e.g., when your husband has
thrown away the packaging of your cereals to save space in
the kitchen shelf). Simple heuristics such as TTB were used
more often if cue information had to be retrieved from
memory than if information was presented at the time of
decision making (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). Gigerenzer and
Todd (1999) argued that people used simple heuristics to limit
information search in memory, which is assumed to be
cognitively demanding. On the basis of these results, we
investigated whether the accessibility of information in
memory affects decision behavior.
Manipulating the accessibility of cue information
The aim of this article is to show that people use different
strategies for solving memory-based decisions, depending on
whether valid or invalid cue information can be easily
accessed. In the following, we will describe two methods to
perceptually manipulate the accessibility of cue information in
memory. The first method was used in a study by Platzer and
Bröder (2012). The authors’ initial aim was to test an
alternative explanation for the finding that people used
different decision strategies in multi-cue inferences depending
onwhether cues were presented verbally or pictorially (Bröder
& Schiffer, 2003, 2006b). By showing that this format effect
only occurred when less valid pictorial cues were particularly
visually salient (i.e., the alleged format effect was rather a
salience effect ), they clearly demonstrated that strategy
selection in multi-cue inference tasks is influenced by the
accessibility of cue information.
In this article, we will introduce a second, newly developed
method to manipulate the perceptual accessibility of verbal
cue information. The results will show whether the salience
effect found with pictorial cues can be generalized to verbal
cues that differ in accessibility. By showing that salience is but
one means of affecting retrieval amongst others, different
accessibility effects might be explained under a common
theoretical umbrella, such as an effort–accuracy approach
(Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne et al., 1988, 1993).
Visual salience of pictorial cue information
Bröder and Schiffer (2003, 2006b) compared verbal with
pictorial cues, and they showed that in a verbal cue condition
most participants relied on TTB, whereas in a pictorial cue
condition, compensatory strategies were more frequently
used. They argued that this format effect occurred because
pictorial cues were retrieved more easily, thus allowing for a
compensatory cue integration. Platzer and Bröder (2012),
however, showed that in these studies cue validity and cue
salience were confounded, and that the alleged format effect
was rather a salience effect.
In all of these studies (Bröder & Schiffer 2003, 2006b;
Platzer & Bröder, 2012), participants had to solve an invented
criminal case. A famous singer had been killed, and
participants had to find out which of his former girlfriends
was most likely to have committed the murder. Eyewitnesses
had observed the fleeing perpetrator and could remember her
clothing. Accordingly, participants could use information
about the suspects’ clothing (types of coats, tops, trousers,
and bags) as cues for judging the probability of being the
murderer. The experiment consisted of two critical phases: (1)
In a first learning phase, participants learned by heart which
kinds of clothing the suspects had worn. Afterward, they were
informed about the kinds of clothing the perpetrator had worn
according to the statements of the eyewitnesses. Cue validity
was manipulated via the number of witnesses who agreed on a
certain piece of clothing. (2) In a subsequent decision phase,
two suspects were presented, and participants had to decide
which suspect was more likely to have committed the crime.
During this phase, all previously acquired knowledge about
cue values (i.e., articles of clothing) and cue validities had to
be retrieved from memory.
Platzer and Bröder (2012) used a 2 (cue format: verbal vs.
pictorial) × 2 (congruency of validity and salience: congruent
vs. incongruent) between-subjects design to test their salience
hypothesis. In conditions with a verbal cue format, information
about the suspects’ clothing was presented verbally. In
conditions with a pictorial cue format, pictures of suspects were
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shown. In a pilot study, Platzer and Bröder determined the
visual salience of the pictorial cues. In the congruent pictorial
condition (CP), cue validities were assigned to the four cues,
such that the validity and the salience of cues were positively
correlated. In the incongruent pictorial condition (IP), salience
and validity were negatively correlated.
In line with the salience hypothesis, participants in the
verbal conditions, as well as those in the CP condition,
predominantly used TTB. In the IP condition, in which less
valid cues were particularly salient, participants were more
likely to integrate all available cue information in a
compensatory manner. Two main conclusions can be drawn
from these results: First, no evidence supported the idea that
pictorial cues per se could be retrieved more easily. The
alleged format effect suggested by Bröder and Schiffer
(2003, 2006b) was rather a salience effect. Secondly, decision
behavior seemed to be influenced by which information could
be easily retrieved.
Visual salience is just one way of manipulating accessibility.
In addition, varying the visual salience of cues might not only
have affected the accessibility (i.e., how easily information could
be retrieved frommemory), but also the availability (i.e., whether
information could be retrieved at all) of cue information in
memory (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). Since visual salience is
an inherent property of the stimulusmaterial, pictorial cues in
the Platzer and Bröder (2012) study differed in visual
salience already during the learning phase. On the basis
of research demonstrating a positive correlation between
an object’s salience and recall performance (Fine &
Minnery, 2009; Olson, 2002), salient cues might have
been memorized more deeply and could therefore be
better recalled than less salient cues. To test the
generalizability of the salience effect, we developed a
method to manipulate accessibility during retrieval (i.e.,
during the decision phase). The method described in the next
paragraph has the potential to investigate accessibility effects
that are independent of availability effects.
Spatial cueing of verbal cue information
Visual salience is one possibility to manipulate the
accessibility of cue information by enhancing encoding
quality. Information that receives much attention is assumed
to be encoded more deeply than is information that receives
only incidental attention (Dougherty, Gronlund, & Gettys,
2003; Logan, 1988). To manipulate the accessibility at
retrieval , we took advantage of research demonstrating a link
between spatial attention and memory retrieval. We strove to
enhance the accessibility of certain information in memory by
directing a person’s attention to the spatial position on screen
at which this information had been learned previously. This
idea is based on the combination of two well-known
phenomena: the looking-at-nothing phenomenon (Altmann,
2004; Richardson & Spivey, 2000) and the spatial-cueing
paradigm (Posner, 1980; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson,
1980). The looking-at-nothing phenomenon describes the
following finding: If people have to recall information, they
tend to look at the now-blank location at which the
information was previously presented. By using the location
as a retrieval cue, looking at nothing facilitates memory
retrieval for information associated with this location
(Ferreira, Apel, & Henderson, 2008). Using a decision task,
Renkewitz and Jahn (2012) provided evidence that gaze
behavior can validly indicate which piece of information
people try to retrieve.
We argue that if gaze behavior can indicate the search for
information in memory, information search in memory can be
influenced by guiding gaze behavior. This argument is an
extension of the spatial-cueing paradigm: Paying attention to
spatial locations facilitates the processing of stimuli located in
those locations (Posner, 1980; Posner et al., 1980). Whereas
the spatial-cueing paradigm refers to situations in which
information is presented on screen, we expanded this idea to
situations in which information has to be retrieved from
memory. Accordingly, we refer to our method as the spatial-
memory-cueing paradigm (SMC) .
The assumption that eye movements to “nothing” indeed
increase the accessibility of certain information was recently
supported by Johansson (2013). He imposed different eye
movements on participants during test, which, in turn,
influenced the retrieval performance of visuospatial
information. The author concluded that eye movements can
act as facilitatory retrieval cues, and are thus functional for
retrieval rather than just an epiphenomenon.
In previous experiments, in which accessibility was
manipulated via visual salience of pictorial cues, accessibility
and availability effects were probably confounded. With the
SMC, differences in decision behavior cannot be attributed to
differences in encoding quality of cues.
Present study
We were interested in whether individuals integrate easily
accessible information into their judgments. According to the
salience effect (Platzer & Bröder, 2012), we expected strategy
selection to depend on the interaction between cue accessibility
and validity. If valid cue information came to mind easily, the
retrieval would not interfere with TTB’s deliberate search order,
andwe expected people to stop information search and to rely on
TTB. However, if less valid information came tomind easily and
involuntarily, the question would arise whether—and if so,
how—people integrated easily accessible invalid cues into their
judgments. Three predictions would be possible: (1) People
might just ignore easily accessible invalid cues and commence
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with TTB’s deliberate search order according to decreasing
validity of the cues. If this was true, we would expect people to
keep on using TTB. On the basis of Platzer and Bröder’s (2012)
results, however, we argue that ignoring easily accessible
information is evenmore cognitively demanding than integrating
it into the judgment. (2) Another possibility is that people would
dispense with deliberate search and exclusively rely on cue
information that could be accessed easily, regardless of its
validity. For example, a corresponding noncompensatory
strategy might search cue information sequentially according to
its accessibility rather than its validity. Following the idea that
people possess a multitude of domain-specific strategies to
choose from, such a strategy should be included in the “adaptive
toolbox” framework (e.g., Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) if we were
to find empirical evidence for it. However, from an effort–
accuracy perspective (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne et al.,
1988, 1993), deciding solely on the basis of invalid
information seems unreasonable. Although such a
noncompensatory strategy could be applied effortlessly,
it would not allow for making accurate predictions. (3)
Therefore, we hypothesized that easily accessible
information is more likely to be incorporated into the
judgment in a compensatory manner. The following
experiments test these predictions by varying the accessibility
of verbal cue information via the aforementioned SMC.
Experiment 1: Manipulating accessibility
in a between-subjects design
Platzer and Bröder (2012) showed that individuals decided
according to TTB if the validity and the visual salience of
pictorial cues were positively correlated. In contrast,
compensatory strategies were used more often if validity and
visual salience were negatively correlated. Experiment 1
closely resembles the Platzer and Bröder study with respect
to the materials, procedure, and the rationale underlying the
experiment. Instead of manipulating the accessibility of cues
via visual salience, we adopted the SMC. In Experiment
1, we aimed at showing that the effects can be replicated
(1) with verbal materials and (2) if accessibility was




A group of 65 students from the University of Mannheim
volunteered in Experiment 1 (28 females, 37 males; mean age
22 years, SD = 3.90). The data of two students had to be
excluded from further analyses because they had already
participated in a similar study, including postexperimental
debriefing. Participants received either course credit or €5
per hour, plus a performance-contingent payment.
Materials and design
As in previous studies (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003, 2006b;
Platzer & Bröder, 2012), we used the cover story of an
invented criminal case. Participants had to decide which of
ten female suspects was more likely to have killed a famous
singer. Since eyewitnesses could remember the clothing of the
perpetrator, different articles of clothing that the suspects had
worn served as the cues. Suspects differed with regard to their
types of coat (leather jacket, cardigan, blazer), top (polo shirt,
shirt, blouse), trousers (jeans, leggings, linen trousers), and
bag (tote bag, hand bag, leisure bag). The distribution of cue
values among the ten suspects was chosen such that the
different decision strategies (TTB, WADD, and EQW) made
different predictions in the decision phase, which is a
prerequisite for classifying decision strategies. Table 1 shows
the distribution of cue values among the suspects, and Table 2
provides examples of combinations of cue patterns that allow
for discriminating the different decision strategies. Cue
validity was manipulated via the number of witnesses who
agreed on a certain cue. For instance, the more witnesses who
agreed that the suspect had worn a leather jacket, the higher
was the predictive validity of the cue “coat.” The critical cue
value per cue and the validity hierarchy of cues were
determined at random for each participant.
Cue accessibility was manipulated in a between-subjects
design. In the congruent verbal condition (CV), we increased
the accessibility of the most valid cue. In contrast, the least
valid cue was easily accessible in the incongruent verbal
condition (IV).
Table 1 Distribution of cue values among objects, adopted from Bröder
and Schiffer (2003, 2006b)
Cue Patterns Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4
Pattern 1 1 1 0 0
Pattern 2 1 0 1 1
Pattern 3 1 0 1 0
Pattern 4 1 0 0 1
Pattern 5 1 0 0 0
Pattern 6 0 1 1 1
Pattern 7 0 1 1 0
Pattern 8 0 1 0 1
Pattern 9 0 0 1 1
Pattern 10 0 0 1 0
1 denotes a critical cue value, and 0 denotes a noncritical cue value.
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Procedure
The procedure was adopted from Bröder and Schiffer (2003,
2006b) and aligned to the SMC. The experiment consisted of
three phases: a cue learning phase, a decision phase, and a
final memory test.
Cue learning phase Participants learned the cue values of
each of ten suspects by heart via an anticipation learning
paradigm. Each suspect was identified by her name and a
portrait. Names and portraits were randomly assigned to cue
patterns. On each trial, the name and the portrait of one suspect
were presented along with the verbal descriptions of the 12
possible cue values, grouped by cue. The cues were presented
at different positions on screen (top, bottom, left, or right). The
position of each cue was assigned randomly at the beginning
of the experiment but was constant across trials (Fig. 1). For
each cue, participants had to guess (recall) the correct cue
value, starting with the most valid cue, and so on. After
participants had clicked on a cue value, they received
feedback about whether their answer was correct or not.
Every suspect had to be repeated until all cue values were
recalled correctly. These practice trials were continued until
the cue values of all suspects had been learned that way. To
ensure that participants had memorized the information
thoroughly, these practice trials were followed by test trials.
On the test trials, all suspects were presented consecutively,
regardless of any errors in recall. Participants had to correctly
recall at least 90% of the cue values to continue with the
experiment. Otherwise the practice trials were repeated. The
order of suspects and the order of cue values within each cue
were determined randomly. After cue values had been learned,
we informed participants about the predictive validity and the
critical cue values of each cue.
Decision phase On each trial of the subsequent decision phase,
the portraits and names of two suspects were presented in the
middle of the screen, and participants had to decide which
suspect was more likely to have committed the murder. The
position of each suspect on screen was determined at random.
Information about the cue values and the cue validities was
never shown, but had to be retrieved from memory.
Additionally, four fields were shown at the same positions as
the cues during the learning phase (top, bottom, left, and right).
On each trial, one of the fields was colored purple, whereas the
other white fields were just marked by a light purple frame
(Fig. 2). By highlighting one of the fields, we guided a person’s
attention to a certain position on screen. According to the SMC,
cue information that had been learned at this position before
should be retrieved more easily than other cue information.
Participants were told that the fields were irrelevant for making
the decision and could therefore be ignored.
Participants had to make 73 decisions in randomized order,
with the only exception being that identical paired
comparisons were not presented consecutively. The number
of trials resulted from a full paired comparison between the ten
suspects (45 trials). Eight comparisons that discriminated
between TTB and the compensatory strategies (WADD,
Table 2 Examples of combinations of cue patterns that were presented in the decision phase of Experiment 1, and choice predictions of the strategies
Item Type Cue Pattern Cue Values Predictions
Condition Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 TTB WADD EQW TTS
CV 1 A 1 1 0 0 A A A –
B 1 0 0 0
2 A 1 1 0 0 A B B –
B 1 0 1 1
3 A 1 1 0 0 A A Guess –
B 1 0 1 0
IV 1 A 1 1 0 0 A A A A
B 1 0 0 0
2 A 1 1 0 0 A B B B
B 1 0 1 1
3 A 1 1 0 0 A A Guess A
B 1 0 1 0
4 A 1 1 0 0 A A Guess B
B 1 0 0 1
5 A 1 0 0 1 A B B A
B 0 1 1 1
TTB = take-the-best, WADD = weighted additive rule, EQW = equal weight rule, TTS = take the most salient, CV = congruent verbal condition, IV =
incongruent verbal condition.
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EQW) were presented twice, to allow for a more reliable
strategy classification. In all of these 53 trials, the most valid
cue was highlighted by a purple field in the CV condition,
whereas the least valid cue was highlighted in the IV
condition. The strategy classification was based on the
decisions made on these trials.
Fig. 2 Example of a trial in the decision phase in Experiments 1 and 2
Fig. 1 Example of a trial in the cue learning phase in Experiments 1 and 2
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To reduce the demand characteristics of the manipulation,
the 20 paired comparisons in which all strategies made
identical predictions were presented a second time (see
Table 2, Item Type 1). On these noncritical trials, the four
positions were highlighted five times each. On two out of
these five trials (about 11% of all trials), we introduced a recall
test. After participants had made a decision, we asked them to
recall one of the cue values that they had learned at the
highlighted position before.
Final memory test One prerequisite for strategy classification
is that cue values be remembered correctly throughout the
experiment. To test memory performance, we conducted a
memory test at the end of the experiment. The final memory
test was identical in procedure to the test trials from the
cue learning phase.
Results
Memory performance On average, 86.38% (SD = 9.59) of the
cue information was recalled correctly in the final memory
test. Hence, the cue patterns in all experimental conditions
were memorized well enough to warrant further analyses. As
expected, cues did not differ with respect to their encoding
quality. All four cues were remembered equally well [F (3,
189) = 0.61, p = .61, η2 = .01, (1 – β ) = .99, for a medium
effect], and no interaction occurred for memory performance
across cues and experimental conditions [F(3, 189) = 0.88,
p = .45, η2 = .01, (1 – β ) = .99 for a medium effect].
Classification of decision strategies We used an outcome-
based maximum-likelihood method to assess the
individual decision strategy (Bröder, 2010). In a
nutshell, this method identifies the best-fitting strategy
by comparing the predicted choice vector of each
decision strategy with the observed choice vector of
each participant. Four strategies were considered for
classification: TTB, WADD, EQW, and a strategy that
was referred to as “take the most salient” (TTS; Platzer
& Bröder, 2012). Platzer and Bröder conceptualized
TTS as a noncompensatory strategy that searches cues
sequentially, ordered by their visual salience. In the
present experiment, however, either the most valid cue
(CV condition) or the least valid cue (IV condition) was
highlighted. The accessibility of all other cues was not
manipulated. Hence, it would have been inadequate to
fit a TTS strategy that was based on a distinct
accessibility hierarchy of cues. Accordingly, we fitted
a version in which TTS searches cues sequentially,
starting with the cue that is easy to access (which is
the most valid cue in the CV condition and the least
valid cue in the IV condition). If this cue discriminates
between options, TTS stops information search and
chooses the option with the critical cue value. If this
cue does not discriminate, TTS continues the
information search according to the cue validities.
Since TTB and TTS made identical predictions in the
CV condition, TTS was fitted only in the IV condition.
Assuming that individuals sometimes made errors when
applying a strategy, binomial response error models
served as a basis for classification. Participants were
classified as being a user of the strategy with the
highest likelihood if two conditions were met: First,
the adherence rates for the best-fitting model should
be higher than 60% (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003).2
Secondly, the estimated response error bε for the best-
fitting model should be equally distributed across item
types (see Table 2 for an overview of the different item
types in the CV and IV conditions). Otherwise, the
assumption that bε reflects unsystematic error would
be violated (Moshagen & Hilbig, 2011). The pattern of
a participant was classified as a guessing strategy if at
least one requirement was not fulfilled. However,
“guessing” included not only pure guessing, but also
other strategies that we did not consider.
We report two different measures of classification
reliability: likelihood ratios as a comparative measure,
and adherence rates as a measure of absolute model fit.
Likelihood ratios, denoting how much more likely the
data are under the assumption of the best compared to
the second-best model, indicated that more than 85% of
all participants could be classified with at least moderate
confidence (Wasserman, 2000; see our Table 3).3
Adherence rates indicated that across all conditions
and strategies, about 80% of the observed choices
matched the choices predicted by the classified strategy
(Table 4).
Table 5 reports the strategy classification frequencies
across conditions. More participants relied on TTB in the
CV condition (58.82%) than in the IV condition (25.81%).
In contrast, compensatory strategies were used more
frequently in the IV condition (35.48%) than in the CV
condition (23.53%, Fig. 3). Additionally, no participant used
2 We used the convention introduced by Bröder and Schiffer (2003):
Stricter criteria yield comparable effect sizes. The difference would still
be conventionally significant with an adherence rate of 70% [χ2(1, N =
41) = 4.78, p = .03, bw = .34], but not with an 80% threshold [χ2(1, N =
21) = 2.65, p = .10, bw = .36]. Note the extremely low power in the latter
case, however.
3 Why are the likelihood ratios for WADD and EQW smaller than the
likelihood ratio of TTB? WADD and EQW can only be discriminated on
the basis of some trials on which WADD makes distinct predictions,
whereas EQW has to guess. Hence, the likelihoods of WADD and EQW
are generally more similar than the likelihoods of TBB and either WADD
or EQW.
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the TTS strategy. Comparing the frequency distributions of
TTB and the pooled compensatory strategies (COMP: i.e.,
WADD and EQW) across experimental conditions indicated
a preponderance of TTB in the CV condition, whereas most
participants used compensatory strategies in the IV condition
[(χ2 (1, N = 47) = 4.04, p = .04, bw = 0.29].
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 corroborate the assumption that the
accessibility effect also occurs with verbal materials and if
accessibility is manipulated during retrieval. Hence, the salience
effect is a special case of a broader phenomenon that is based on
the accessibility of cue information in memory. Experiment 1
replicated Platzer and Bröder’s (2012) result that strategy
selection is influenced by the interaction between the validity
and the accessibility of cue information. As we hypothesized,
participants relied on TTB if valid information came to mind
easily. Here, involuntary retrieval of highly accessible
information would not interfere with TTB’s deliberate search
order, but rather would support it. However, if less valid
information came to mind easily, neither was this information
ignored (by also using TTB) nor did people decide solely on the
basis of this information (by using TTS). Rather, most
participants relied on some kind of compensatory strategy in
the IV condition. Additionally, the number of guessers increased
in the IVrelative to the CV condition [(χ2 (2,N = 64) = 6.86, p =
.03, bw = 0.33]. One plausible explanation is based on the finding
that simple heuristics, such as TTB, are used more frequently if
decisions have to be made frommemory, in order to keepmental
costs as low as possible (Bröder& Schiffer, 2003). Using TTB in
the IV condition would require ignoring information that came to
mind easily and concentrating on valid information instead. In
fact, it took TTB users longer to complete the decision phase in
the IV condition (18.03 min) than in the CV condition (11.98
min) [t(26) = 2.08, p = .05, d = 0.87]—namely, approximately
as long as it took compensatory decision makers (21.88 min) in
both conditions [t(25) = 0.37, p = .72, d = 0.15, (1 – β) = .21, for
a medium effect]. If for a person both TTB and COMPwere too
cognitively demanding, the only alternative might have been
just to guess, since in general TTS was not considered
appropriate.
One reason for developing the SMC was the ambition to
investigate accessibility effects that are independent of the
availability of cue information. Therefore, we manipulated
the accessibility of cues exclusively during the decision phase.
This was done to ensure that accessible cues were not
memorized better in the learning phase than were less
accessible cues. Our results concerning memory performance
for cues could be interpreted as a measure of the discriminant
validity of the experimental manipulation. All cues were
remembered equally well, regardless of our experimental
manipulation. Hence, the SMC did not influence the
availability of information in memory.
Table 4 Adherence rates of decision strategies in Experiment 1
Decision Strategy
Condition TTB WADD EQW
CV 77.08 75.85 87.04
IV 74.06 86.04 82.87
TTB = take-the-best, WADD = weighted additive rule, EQW = equal
weight rule, CV = congruent verbal condition, IV = incongruent verbal
condition. Adherence rates are based on the participants classified as
using this strategy.
Table 5 Frequencies and percentages of decision strategies
(in parentheses) within conditions in Experiment 1
Decision Strategy
Condition TTB WADD EQW Guess Unclass
CV 20 (58.82) 5 (14.71) 3 (8.82) 6 (17.65) –
IV 8 (25.81) 5 (16.13) 6 (19.35) 11 (35.48) 1 (3.23)
TTB = take-the-best, WADD = weighted additive rule, EQW = equal
weight rule, Guess = guessing (adherence rates < 60% and/or errors not
randomly distributed across item types), Unclass = unclassified pattern
(identical likelihoods for two strategies), CV = congruent verbal
condition, IV = incongruent verbal condition.
Table 3 Likelihood ratios (LR) for different strategies in Experiment 1 (strategy with highest likelihood divided by strategy with second-
highest likelihood)
% of Participants With Different LRsa
Strategy N Md (LR) LR < 3 (weak evidence) 3 < LR ≤ 10 (moderate evidence) LR > 10 (strong evidence)
TTB 28 125.48 – 28.57 71.43
WADD 10 6.92 30.00 30.00 40.00
EQW 9 13.01 44.44 11.11 44.44
TTB = take-the-best, WADD = weighted additive rule, EQW = equal weight rule.
a Conventions for weak/moderate/strong evidence in favor of a model are based on Wasserman (2000).
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Experiment 2: Manipulating accessibility
in a within-subjects design
In Experiment 1, accessibility was manipulated in a between-
subjects design. The results indicated that people applied
different decision strategies, depending on whether the most
valid cue (CV condition) or the least valid cue (IV condition)
could be accessed easily.
In principle, strategy classification methods are based on the
presupposition that decision makers use a certain strategy
throughout the experiment. Choosing the option that is not
predicted by the applied strategy is attributed to unsystematic
response error. In Experiment 2, these changes in the decision
behavior of participants were precisely what we were interested
in. For Experiment 2, we aimed at replicating the results from
Experiment 1 by means of a within-subjects design. In this
experiment, we were not interested in classifying participants as
users of a certain strategy. Rather, we investigated whether the
decision behavior changed throughout the decision process,
depending on the validity of easily accessible cues. If this was
the case, we would learn something on a theoretical (1) as well
as on a methodological (2) level: (1) If people were to adapt
their decision behavior on a trial-by-trial level, this would mean
that they were highly sensitive to the accessibility of
information. Not only would they establish a certain strategy,
but they could adapt their decision behavior when the validity
of easily accessible cues changed. This would be particularly
interesting for research on decision routines, which has
suggested that people are extremely reluctant to change their
decision strategy (e.g., Bröder & Schiffer, 2006a). More
importantly, however, such a result would perhaps put in
question the idea that strategies are selected in the first place.
(2) On a methodological level, short-term changes in decision
behavior according to the cues’ accessibility could be
interpreted in terms of the construct validity of our experimental
manipulation: If decision behavior can bemanipulated on a trial
level with the SMC, this would provide further evidence that
the SMC actually manipulates short-term accessibility.
Method
Participants
A group of 76 students from the University of Mannheim
participated in Experiment 2 (55 females, 21 males; mean age
21 years, SD = 2.50). One participant had to be excluded
because of an attempt to deceive.4 The participants received
either course credit or €5 per hour, plus a performance-
contingent payment.
Materials and design
We used the same cover story of an invented criminal case as
in Experiment 1. All of the materials used in the Experiments
1 and 2 were identical. In contrast to Experiment 1, cue
accessibility was manipulated in a within-subjects design.
On half of the critical trials, the most valid cue was made
easily accessible (congruent verbal, CV). On the other half of
the trials, the least valid cue was made easily accessible
(incongruent verbal, IV).
Procedure
As in Experiment 1, the procedure was subdivided into three
phases: (1) In the cue learning phase , the cue values of each
suspect had to be learned by means of an anticipation learning
paradigm. (2) In the subsequent decision phase , participants
had to decide which suspect was more likely to have committed
the murder by retrieving information about the cue values and
validities from memory. (3) Memory performance for the cue
values was tested in the final memory test . The procedures of
Experiments 1 and 2 were identical, except for the composition
of the trials in the decision phase. Therefore, we will only
describe the decision phase in greater detail.
Decision phase Participants had to make 53 decisions in
randomized order, with the only exception being that identical
paired comparisons were not presented consecutively. The
4 The participant avoided learning the cue patterns during the learning
phase by taking pictures of the suspects with a cellphone.
Fig. 3 Percentages of participants using take-the-best (TTB) or a
compensatory strategy (COMP: WADD or EQW) in Experiment 1,
depending on experimental conditions (CV, congruent verbal; IV,
incongruent verbal)
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eight decisions that discriminated between TTB and either
WADD or EQW were presented twice. On four of these
critical trials (which were presented twice), the most valid
cue was highlighted by the purple field (CV trials). On the
remaining four critical trials (again presented twice), the least
valid cue was highlighted (IV trials). All of the following
analyses are based on these 16 critical trials, since all
strategies made the same predictions on the remaining 38
trials. On these 38 trials, the fields were highlighted such
that across all 53 trials, every position was highlighted




With 88.27% (SD = 7.93) of the cue information being
recalled correctly, memory performance was comparably high
relative to that in Experiment 1. Additionally, all cues were
remembered equally well [F (3, 222) = 2.59, p = .054,
η2 = .03, (1 – β ) = .99, for a medium effect].
Decision behavior
In Experiment 2, cue accessibility was manipulated on a trial
level. By highlighting one of four positions on screen, we
enhanced the accessibility of the cue information that had
been learned at this position. As was hypothesized, the TTB
option was chosen more often if the most valid cue was easily
accessible (53.83% of all critical CV trials). In contrast,
participants were less likely to choose the TTB option—and,
complementarily, they were more likely to choose the
compensatory option—if the least valid cue was easily
accessible [45.50% of all critical IV trials; mean difference =
8.33, SE(mean difference) = 3.82, p = .03, d = 0.36, on the
basis of bootstrap results with 3,000 samples].5
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 support the finding that the
validity as well as the accessibility of cue information is
important to explain decision behavior: People were more
likely to choose the option predicted by TTB if the
accessibility and validity of a cue converged. If easily
accessible information was invalid, people preferred to choose
the option consistent with WADD or EQW. This was
demonstrated in a within-subjects design in which
accessibility was manipulated on a trial level: On half of the
critical trials, the most valid cue was highlighted. On the other
half of the critical trials, the least valid cue was highlighted.
Our results indicate that people react highly sensitively to
the accessibility of information. They change their decision
behavior even within one task, depending on the validity of
the easily accessible information. The finding that decision
behavior can be manipulated on a trial level with the SMC
provides further evidence that it actually manipulates short-
term accessibility.
General discussion
Showing that judgment and decision behavior is influenced by
the accessibility of information in memory has a long tradition
(see e.g., Marewski & Schooler, 2011). It has been shown that
the ease with which information can be brought to mind
affected, for instance, the estimated frequencies and
probabilities of events (availability heuristic; e.g., Gabrielcik
& Fazio, 1984; Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, &
Combs, 1978; Pachur, Hertwig, & Steinmann, 2012; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1973), judgments about the self and others
(e.g., Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989; Schwarz
et al., 1991), judgments of truth (Reber & Schwarz, 1999),
and recognition judgments (e.g., Johnston, Dark, & Jacoby,
1985; Johnston, Hawley, & Elliott, 1991). Moreover,
manipulating the processing fluency of certain features in
multi-cue tasks influenced the evaluations of objects (Shah
&Oppenheimer, 2007) and also object preferences (Mandel &
Johnson, 2002).
The experiments reported in this article took a closer look
at the cognitive processes underlying decision behavior in
multi-cue inferences from memory. This article aimed at
answering the question whether—and, if so, how—
individuals consider easily accessible information, depending
on the predictive validity of this information. Platzer and
Bröder (2012) were the first to show that strategy selection
depends on the interaction between the accessibility and the
validity of cues. In their study, accessibility was manipulated
via the visual salience of pictorial cues. We developed the
SMC to test whether their findings can be replicated (1)
with verbal materials and (2) if accessibility is
manipulated during retrieval.
In the introduction, we asked three questions to which our
study could provide answers: (1) Do people ignore easily
accessible information that is not valid? If this was true, we
5 We also conducted the same analyses for Experiment 1. In line with
Experiment 2, participants were more likely to choose the option
predicted by TTB in the CV condition (60.11% of all critical trials) than
in the IV condition (45.16% of all critical trials). However, the difference
was not significant on the basis of bootstrap results with 3,000 samples
[mean difference = 14.95, SE (mean difference) = 7.48, p = .051,
d = 0.50], which might be due to low statistical power.
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would expect to find the same amount of TTB users (Exp. 1) or
TTB-compatible choices (Exp. 2) in the incongruent and
congruent conditions. Clearly, this was not the case. As
compared to the congruent conditions, fewer participants used
TTB in the incongruent conditions. Reaction time data
indicated that it seemed to be equally cognitively demanding
to ignore invalid information if it came to mind easily as to
integrate it into the judgment (cf., Platzer & Bröder, 2012). In a
nutshell, the results indicate that accessible information is
considered. Presumably, involuntary retrieval interferes with
the deliberate search order of TTB. The second and the third
questions addressed the issue whether accessible information is
integrated in a noncompensatory, or rather compensatory,
manner. (2) Do people exclusively rely on information that
can be accessed easily, regardless of its validity? In this case,
we would expect to find a considerable number of TTS users in
the incongruent condition. This was not confirmed. No single
person used TTS in Experiment 1. (3) Or, is information that
can be accessed easily just more likely to be incorporated into
the judgment in a compensatory manner? In line with previous
studies, our results suggest that this was the case. Individuals
did not trust information only because it could be easily
accessed. Rather, they integrated all available cue information
in a compensatory manner if invalid information came to mind
easily. Since this also happened on a trial-by-trial basis in
Experiment 2’s within subjects manipulation, one may
speculate that an evidence accumulation model (e.g., Lee &
Cummins, 2004) rather than a model assuming strategy
selection is more appropriate. In such a model, the weighting
of cues could be a function of both validity and salience of cues.
However, our results can be interpreted in both frameworks.
From an evolutionary perspective, it might be considered
advantageous to take easily accessible information into
account. Fine and Minnery (2009) argued that “[t]he tendency
to orient attention toward visually salient stimuli is conserved
across species and likely confers an evolutionary advantage
by enabling an organism to rapidly detect and react to
behaviorally relevant objects and events within its
environment” (p. 8018). This idea was implemented also in
early theories of associative learning, which pointed to the
relation between stimulus salience and “associability”: Salient
stimuli enter into associations more readily than do other
stimuli (e.g., Rescorla, 1988). Studies within the context of
cognitive fluency also suggested an ecological correlation
between retrieval fluency (e.g., manipulated via visual
salience; Unkelbach, 2006) and the validity of information
(Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & Reimer, 2008), and that in
certain environments, a strategy that orders cues according
to the speed of retrieving them could make good predictions
(Gaissmaier, 2007). Although it seems to be adaptive to
consider salient information in some natural environments,
one can imagine several counterexamples, especially in the
field of sales promotion. Going back to our example of buying
healthy cereals: Would it be a good idea to buy oat cereal just
because the first thing that comes to your mind is the good-
looking organic farmer from the billboard?
People might incorporate easily accessible information
because they believe in this positive correlation between the
accessibility of information and its validity. For instance, Shah
and Oppenheimer (2007) provided evidence that people
placed more weight on information that felt easy to process.
As a consequence, people should tend to overestimate the
importance of invalid cues that can be accessed easily. We
tested this assumption empirically by asking participants to
evaluate the importance of each cue for the prediction of the
decision criterion at the end of Experiment 1. Importance
ratings were judged per cue using a slider that ranged from 0
(unimportant) to 100 (very important ). If the accessibility of a
cue affected its perceived importance, we would expect
participants to report higher subjective importance ratings
for less valid cues in the incongruent than in the congruent
condition. Hence, we would expect the structure of cue
weights to be more compensatory in the IV than in the CV
condition. This assumption was not supported by our data. A
repeated measures analysis of variance with the Importance
Ratings for each of the four cues as a within-subjects factor
and Condition as a between-subjects factor did not provide
any evidence for an interaction between cue ratings and
condition [F (2.06, 129.79) = 0.30, p = .75, η 2 = .005,
(1 – β ) = .99, for a medium effect]. Additionally, the
variances of importance ratings of the four cues did not differ
between conditions, which should have been the case if we
expected a more compensatory structure of ratings in the IV
condition [mean difference = 126.98, SE(mean difference) =
159.89, p = .44, d = 0.20, on the basis of bootstrap results with
3,000 samples]. In sum, these results indicate that people
probably did not (mis)attribute the higher accessibility of a
cue to its validity, as was suggested by Shah and Oppenheimer
(2007) and Oppenheimer (2008). One possible explanation
for these diverging results is that Shah and colleagues did not
provide cue validities. As a consequence, processing fluency
was the only basis for inferring the importance of each cue.
Since this explanation is post-hoc, it will be an interesting
avenue for future research to further disentangle the
interaction between the accessibility and the validity of cue
information. Maybe one can think of constellations of cues in
which the accessibility overrides the validity of cues. For
instance, one might expect to find TTS users if the cues did
not differ in validity. Additionally, this might also affect
importance ratings, since there would be no other clue for
ordering the cues, as in the studies by Shah and Oppenheimer.
One caveat about all studies on memory-based
probabilistic inferences hitherto conducted concerns the
boundary conditions of the effects reported. In these studies,
cue information of objects had been learned just prior to the
decision phase, which might lead to a memory representation
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quite different from, for example, the well-integrated, or even
automatized, knowledge of experts. Whether the formerly
reported effects of retrieval costs and their manipulation
conducted here would generalize to situations involving more
expertise is ultimately an interesting empirical question yet to
be researched.
Given the results reported here, does it make sense from a
marketing perspective to make certain positive characteristics
of a product particularly accessible, even if they do not
correlate with the criterion dimension? For example, if you
want people to believe that your cereals are exceptionally
healthy, does it make sense to let an eye-catching organic
farmer—who will easily be remembered later—smile at
pedestrians from a billboard? The answer is “yes” and “no.”
By doing so, you can make sure that this information will be
considered during the decision process, especially if it is
invalid. Nevertheless, you cannot count on people deciding
solely on the basis of this information.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
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